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IN BE PEREZ
[Crim. No.1003L In Bank.

[65C.2d
Sept. 21, 1966.]

. In re GEORGE ANTHONY PEREZ on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Habeas Corpus-Petition-Time for Filing.-Defendant's delay .
of almost tliree years in applying for a writ of habeas corpus
on the grounds that he was denied the aid of counsel when
judgment and sentence were pronounced was sufliciently
explained by allegations that he had not completed the seventh
grade in school at the time he entered state prison, that he
knew nothing of legal rights or procedures, and that he has
diligently used the limited opportunities available to prisoners .
for legal research in the preparation of legal documents.
[2a-2d] Criminal Law - Probation - Revocation: Sentence Formalities in Passing Sentence-Presence of Defendant and.
Oounsel.-A probationer unconstitutionally sentenced under
former P.en. Code, § 1203.2a, following his commitment for
another offense, is in the same position he would be had there
been no such statute. That is, unless he competently waives his
right to be present and represented by counsel when judgment
is pronounced, he is entitled to proper arraignment for judgment, and the court that originally granted probation is not
deprived of jurisdiction to impose sentence by the provision in
formel" § 1203.2a, nullifying jurisdiction for failure to pronounce judgment within 30 days.
[3] Id.-Proceedi,gs on Issue of Mentally Disordered Sex 01render.-Proceedings leading to commitments of mentally disordered sex offenders begin with and rest on the conviction of
a "criminal offense" (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5501); and though a
probationers confinement in prison was not under a commitment based on a judgment of conviction of crime, but
commitment as a sexual psychopath, that commitment was "for
another offense" within the meaning of former Pen. Code,
§ 1203.2a, requiring a court that granted probation without
imposing sentence, on being notified of the probationers
commitment to prison for another offense, to impose sentence
or otherwise terminate its jurisdiction in the case.

[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 39; Am.Jur., Habeas
Corpus (1st ed § 55).
[3] See Oa.l.Jur.2d, Insane and Incompetent Persons, § 138 et
seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Habeas Corpus, § 51; [2] Criminal
Law, §§ 995; 1005; [3, 4] Criminal Law, § 236.1; [5] Criminal
Law, § 236.1, 995; [6, 10] Habeas Corpus, § 34(1)(b); [7] Criminal Law, §§ 107, 1005; [8] Criminal Law, § 110; [9] CJ"iminal Law,
§ 1440; [11] Constitutional Law, § 63; [12] Constitutional Law,
§ 64; Criminal Law, § 995.
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[4] IeL-Proceedings on Issue of Mentally Disordered Sex 01fender.-Where a probationer, whose sentences for four crimes had
been suspended, was committed to a state prison as a sexual
psychopath in connection with a charge of statutory rape, his
commitment brought him within the purpose of former Pen.
Code, § 1203.2a, precluding outstanding probationary orders
against one confined in a state prison and the uncertainty as to
whether the court that granted probation would impose sentence on the prisoner.
[6] Id.-Proceedings on Issue of Mentally Disordered Sex 01fender: Probation-Revocation.-Fairness to one committed to a
state prison and proper' administration by prison officials and
the Adult Authority require that outstanding convictions be
reduced to judgment or be otherwise finally disposed of by
termination of a trial court's jurisdiction. These considerations
apply to one committed to a state prison as a sexual psychopath who would not benefit by hospital care, as well as to one
sentenced to prison as a convicted felon .
.[8] Habeas Oorpus-Grounds for Relief-Judgment or SentencePronouncement in Absence of Oounsel.-Pronouncement of
judgment is a critical stage in a criminal prosecution when the
constitutional rights "to appear and defend, in person and with
counsel" (Const., art. I, § 13) apply, and a judgment pronounced in violation of those rights can be attacked by habeas
corpus.
[7] Oriminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Oounsel: Sentence
-Formalities in Passing-Presence of Defendant and Oounsel.
-At the pronouncement of judgment, there are substantial
reasons for the presence of the accused and for the aid of
counsel. Most defendants would be helpless in matters involving
good cause for an arrest of judgment or a new trial, or the
accused's insanity, or evidence and argument in mitigation of
punishment when a choice of sentence is available, or the rein4
statement of probation revoked in the accused's absence.
Further an accused might allow the time for appeal to run in
ignorance of the right to appeal and of grounds for reversal.
[8] IeL-Rights of Accused-Aid of Oounsel-Waiver.-A waiver
of the right to counsel at the pronouncement of judgment will
not be implied from defendant's execution of a document reciting only a waiver of his right to be personally present without
any mention of the right to counsel.
[9] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Judgment and Sentence. - A
jUdgment of conviction cannot stand where defendant was not
aiforded the opportunity to have assistance of counsel at the
time sentence was pronounced.
[10] Habeas Oorpus-Grounds for Relief-Judgment or Sentence
-Pronouncement in Absence of Oounsel.-In a proceeding in
DC.acs......
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habeas corpus, where nothing in the record shows any defect
in the trial court's finding that defendant was guilty of the
crimes for which he was sentenced, the trial court's unconstitutional procedure, in pronouncing judgment and sentence
without affording defendant the aid of counsel, ordinarily
would not !ead to loss of power to impose a valid sentence.
Defendant would be returned to the trial court to be arraigned
for judgment with the opportunity there to show cause why
judgment should not be pronounced.
[11] Constitutional Law - Constitutionality of Statute - Partial
Unconstitutionality.-Though part of a statute is declared
unconstitutional, the remainder will stand where it is complete
in itself and would have been adopted by the legislative body
had it foreseen the partial invalidation.
[12] Id.-Constitutionality of Statutes - Partial Unconstitutionality - Inseparable Provisions: Criminal Law - ProbationRevocation.-Though deletion of the unconstitutional part of
former Pen. Code, § 1203.2a, permitting imposition of a probationer's sentence in his absence when he was committed for
another offense, would leave a coherent and complete statute,
the Legislature would not have provided that court action
under an unconstitutional procedure would lead to loss of
jurisdiction to proceed constitutionally and would not have
adopted the remaining constitutional part had it foreseen the
partial invalidation.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. Petitioner discharged from the custody of prison
authorities and committed to the custody of the sheriff of Los
Angeles County for arraignment and pronouncement of judgment; in all other respects, petition denied.
George Anthony Perez, in pro. per., and Robert Y. Bell,
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Edward P. 0 'Brien
and Robert R. Granucci, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner attacks the validity of a
judgment of the Los Angeles County Superior Court imposing
concurrent sentences for two counts of lewd acts against children (Pen. Code, § 288), one count of oral copulation (Pen.
Code, § 288a), and one count of kidnaping (Pen. Code, § 207).
Judgment was pronounced on March 28, 1963, while petitioner
was confined in San Quentin State Prison.
In 1959 the Los Angeles court found petitioner guilty of the
four crimes, suspended the criminal proceedings, held sexual
psychopathy hearings, and committed petitioner to a state
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hospital for treatment. In 1960 he was returned to the superior
court, the criminal proceedings were resumed, imposition of
sentence was suspended, and petitioner was placed on probation for five years.
In August 1962 petitioner pleaded guilty in Orange County
to statutory rape. The Orange County Superior Court
suspended the criminal proceedings and, after sexual psychopathy hearings, committed petitioner to the Department of
Mental Hygiene and ordered him delivered to the state prison
for an indeterminate period. (WeIf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5512,
5518.) In February 1963 he was received at· San Quentin State
Prison under the Orange County commitment. He does not
question the validity of that commitment.
In June 1963, at the request of a correctional counselor,
petitioner signed a document stating that the Los Angeles
County Superior Court was authorized to impose sentence in
his absence on the 1959 convictions. This document, quoted in
the margin,1 does not mention' petitioner's right to counsel at
the time of pronouncement of judgment and sentencing. A few
days after petitioner signed this document he received a notice
that he had been sentenced by the Los Angeles court and that
his term on the four concurrent sentences commenced April 23,
1963.
In April 1966 petitioner in propria persona filed the instant
petition for habeas corpus. We issued an order to show cause
on the basis of his allegations that he had not understandingly
waived his right to be present and represented by counsel
when judgment was pronounced.
1"

.

To THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. COUNTY 01'

Los ANGELES
" Gentlemen:
"1, GEORGE A. PEREZ, have heretofore been convicted in the above court
of the offenses of Violation of Penal Code Sections 288, 288a, and 207.
under Superior Court Case No. 212953. On December 16, 1960, the Judge
of said court ordered that proceedings in the said matter be suspended
without imposition of sentence and granted probation to me.
"That thereafter, on or about August 13, 1962, the order of probation
was revoked. Thereafter, on January 3, 1963, I was ordered committed
to the Department of Mental Hygiene from the County of Orange, as a
sexual psychopath, and am now incarcerated in the California Stati!
Prison at San Quentin under identification number A-76012-S.
" It is to my advantage that all offenses of which I have been convicted be dealt with by the Department of Corrections and the Adult
Authority at one time, and I therefore respectfully request the above
Superior Court to impose its sentence, heretofore withheld.
, 'I know that I am entitled to be present in court at the time' sentence
is pronounced against me, and I do specifically authorize such sentence to
be imposed against me for the offenses hereinabove stated, Violation of
Penal Code Sections 288, 288a, and 207, in my absence."
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[1] Respondent urges that petitioner is not entitled to
relief because he did not apply for the writ of habeas corpus
until almost three years after he received notice that the Los
Angeles court had imposed the sentence now attacked. Petitioner's delay in applying for the writ is sufficiently explained
by his allegations that when he entered the state prison he had
not completed the seventh grade in school and knew nothing of
legal rights or procedures, and that he has diligently used the
limited opportunities available to prisoners for legal research
and the preparation of legal documents. (See In re James
(1952) 38 Ca1.2d 302, 309 [240 P.2d 596].)
[2a] At the time the Los Angeles court imposed sentence,
section 1203.2a of the Penal Code (Stats. 1943, ch. 321, p.
1316) provided, and as since amended (Stats. 1963, ch. 2079)
now provides, that when a defendant who was released on
probation w.ithout imposition of sentence ''is' committed to a
prison in this State for another offense" the court that
granted probation, upon being notified of defendant's commitment to prison, "shall" impose sentence or make some other
order terminating its jurisdiction in defendant's case. [3] Petitioner's confinement in prison was not under a commitment based on a judgment of conviction of crime but was
under the Orange County commitment as a sexual psychopath.
That commitment, however, was "for another offense" within
the meaning of Penal Code section 1203.2a since the proceedings leading to such commitments of mentally disordered sex
offende:r;'s begin with and rest on the conviction of a "criminal
offense" (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5501). [4] Moreover, the
commitment to a state prison as a sexual psychopath brought
petitioner within the purpose of section 1203.2a. That section
precludes outstanding probationary orders against one confined in a state prison and the uncertainty that would prevail
as to when and whether the court that granted probation will
seek to impose sentence on the prisoner. [5] Fairness to one
committed to a state prison and proper administration by the
prison officials and the Adult Authority require that such outstanding convictions be reduced to judgment or be otherwise
finally disposed of by termination of the trial court's jurisdiction. These considerations apply to one committed to a state
prison as a sexual psychopath who would not benefit by
hospital care as well as to one sentenced to prison as a convicted felon.
[2b] When the Los Angeles County Superior Court pronounced judgment in 1963, section 1203.2a of the Penal Code
purported to permit imposition of sentence in the absence of
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and without notice to one who had been released on probation
and was thereafter committed to a state prison for another
offense. 2 [6] Pronouncement of judgment, however, is a
critical stage in the criminal prosecution when the constitutional rights "to appear and defend, in person and with
counsel" (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13) apply, and a judgment
pronounced in violation of those rights can be attacked by
habeas corpus. (In re Levi (1952) 39 Ca1.2d 41, 46 [244 P.2d
403] ; In re Boberts (1953) 40 Cal.2d 745, 748 [255 P.2d 782] ;
In re Boyce (1959) 51 Ca1.2d 699 [336 P.2d 164] ; In re Klein
(1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 58,63 [17 Cal.Rptr. 71].)
[7] There are substantial reasons for the presence of
accused and the aid of counsel at the pronouncement of judgment. There may be good cause why judgment should not be
pronounced (Pen. Code, § 12(0), e.g., the accused may be
insane or have cause to offer in arrest of judgment or for a
new trial (Pen. Code, § 1201); he may have evidence and
2Seetion 1203.2a (State. 1943, ch. 321, p. 1316) then provided that
"If !'By defendant who has been released on probation is committed to
a prison in this State for another offense, the eourt which released him
on probation shall have jurisdiction to impose sentence, if no sentence
has previously been imposed for the offense for which he was granted
probation, in the absence of the defendant.
"The probation officer may, upon learning of such defendant's imprisonment, and must within 30 days after being notified in writing by
the defendant or his eounsel, or the warden or superintendent or clerk
of the prison in which the defendant is confined, report such commitment
to the court which released the defendant on probation.
"Upon being informed by the probation officer of the defendant's
"confinement, or upon receipt from the warden, superintendent or clerk
• • • of a certi1ieate showing that the defendant is confined in prison,
the court shall issue its commitment if sentence has previously been
imposed, .or shan impose sentence and issue its commitment if sentence
has not previously been imposed, or shall make other final order terminating its jurisdiction over the defendant in the ease in which the order of
probation was made, and if no such order is made within 30 days after
the court has been noti1ied as herein provided of the defendant's confinement, then the court shall be deprived thereafter of any jurisdiction
over the defendant in the ease on which he was granted probation.
"Upon imposition of sentence hereunder the eommitment shall be
dated as of the date upon which probation was granted and if the
defendant is then in a State prison for an offense committed subsequent
to the one upon which he has been on probation, the term of imprisonJDent of such defendant under a commitment issued hereunder shall
commence upon the date upon which defendant was delivered to prison
under commitment for his subsequent offense, unless the court shall order
that the sentence for the prior offense shall commence upon termination
of the sentence for said subsequent offense. The sentence of the court
may be imposed in the absence of the defendant in such cases. In the
event the probation officer fails to report such commitment to the court
or the court fails to impose sentence as herein provided, the court shall
be deprived thereafter of all jurisdiction it may have retained in the
granting of probation in said ease."

)
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argument in mitigation of punishment when a choice 'of sen·
tence is available; when probation has been revoked in his
absence he may be able to show that it should be reinstated.
Without the help of counsel most defendants would not know
of and would be helpless to present these matters. Also they
might allow the time for appeal to run in ignorance of the
right to appeal and of grounds for reversal. (In re Levi
(1952) supra, 39 Cal.2d at pp. 45-46; In re Turrieta (1960) 54
Ca1.2d 816, 819 [8 Cal.Rptr. 737, 356 P.2d 681] ; In re Klein.
(1961) supra, 197 Cal.App.2d at p. 65; In re Jordan (1966)
242 CaI.App.2d 254, 257-258 [51 Cal.Rptr. 221]; see also
People v. De Waele (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 512, 515 [36 Cal.
Rptr.825].)
Thus, In re Klein, supra, 197 Cal.App.2d at pp. 62, 65,
specifically held that pronouncement of judgment under the
provision o£ section 1203.2a purporting to authorize sentencing
in the absence of defendant violated the rights" to appear and
defend, in person and with counsel" (Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 13), and that acceptance of probation by the accused did not
imply acquiescence in that provision of section 1203.2a and
waiver of those constitutional rights. 3
Here, as in Klein., the record shows no actual waiver of those
rights by petitioner when he accepted probation. The waiver
relied on by respondent was made when petitioner signed the
document quoted supra, footnote 1, after judgment had been
pronounced on March 28, 1963, in his absence. Respondent
argues that by signing that document, with its express recital
authorizing imposition of sentence in his absence, petitioner
3The Legislature recognized the holdings of such eases as KZein. and
Levi by amendment of section 1203.2a (Stats. 1963, ch. 2079, effective
September 20, 1963, after this petitioner's sentence and asserted waiver)
to provide that a defendant committed for another crime could be
sentenced in his absence by the court that had withheld imposition of
sentence only "on the request of the defendant made through his
counsel, or by himself in writing, if such writing is signed in the presence
of the warden or superintendent of the prison in which he is confined
or the duly authorized representative of the warden or superintendent.
and such warden or superintendent or his representative attests both
that the defendant has made and signed such request and that he states
that he wishes the court to impose sentence in the case in which he was
released on probation, in his absence and without his being represented
by counsel.

", '.. .

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

. If the case is one in which sentence has not previously been
imposed, the court is deprived of jurisdiction over defendant if it does
not impose sentence and issue its commitment or make other final order
terminating its jurisdiction over defendant in the ease within 30 days
after defendant has, in the manner prescribed by this section, requested
imposition of sentence."
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impliedly waived his right to the aid of counsel at the time of
sentence. . [8] We have refused to imply a waiver of the
right to counsel from the mere presence of the accused when
judgment is pronounced (In re Levi, supra, 39 Cal.2d at pp.
46-47; In re Roberts, supra., 40 Ca1.2d at p. 748; In re Boyce,
supra, 51 Ca1.2d at p. 700; In re Turrieta, supra, 54Ca1.2d at
p. 820) ; similarly here, a waiver of the right to counsel will
not be implied from petitioner's execution of a document that
recites only a waiver .of the right to personal presence and
does not mention the right to counsel.
[9] Since petitioner was not afforded the opportunity to
have assistance of counsel when the Los Angeles court pronounced sentence, its judgment cannot stand, and we need not
resolve the factual question presented by petitioner's allegations that his waiver of the right to be present in person was
incompetent because he signed the document without understanding its effect.
[10] Nothing in the present record shows any defect in the
finding of the Los Angeles court that petitioner was guilty of
the four crimes. In such a case the subsequent unconstitutional
procedure at the time of sentence ordinarily would not lead to
loss or power to impose a valid sentence. The prisoner would
be returned to the trial court to be arraigned for judgment
with the opportunity there to show cause why judgment
should not be pronounced. (In re Levi, supra, 39 Ca1.2d 41,
47.) [2c] Section 1203.2a as it read when petitioner was
sentenced (Stats. 1943, ch. 321, p. 1316) provided, however,
that unless the superior court imposed sentence within 30 days
after it was notified of the defendant's confinement in a state
prison the court was "deprived thereafter of any jurisdiction
over the defendant" in the case in which the order of probation was made. If this last quoted provision of section 1203.2a
as it formerly read remained in effect despite the invalidity of
the provision permitting imposition of sentence in the defendant's absence and despite the section's omission of any provision securing the defendant's right to counsel, petitioner and
others similarly situated could never be punished for crimes
that led to imposition of sentences in a manner purportedly
but unconstitutionally authorized by the Legislature.
[11] "When part of a statute is declared unconstitutional,
tIle remainder will stand if it is complete in itself and would
have been adopted by the legislative body had the latter foreseen the partial invalidation of the statute." (In re Bell
(1942) 19 Ca1.2d 488, 498 [122 P.2d 22] ; see Estate of Phil-
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lips (1928) 203 Cal. 106, 113 [263 P. 1017].) [12] Deletion
of the unconstitutional part of former section 1203.2a would
leave a coherent statute complete in itself, but not one that the
Legislature would have adopted had it foreseen the partial
invalidation of the statute. We do not believe that the Legislature would have provided that court action under an unconstitutional procedure should nevertheless lead to loss of
jurisdiction to proceed constitutionally. The statutory plan
that the Legislature would have adopted had it foreseen that
former section 1203.2a was in part unconstitutional is indicated by the 1963 amendment of the section. That amendment
does not simply delete the unconstitutional provision for the
imposition of sentence in the defendant's absence, but provides a different procedure that recognizes the defendant's
right to be present and represented by counsel. (See People v.
Fisherman (965) 237 Cal.App.2d 356, 361-362 [47 Cal.Rptr.
33].)
Before the enactment of section 1203.2a, a court that had
suspended imposition of sentence and granted probation to one
who later found himself in the situation of this petitioner or
of Klein (197 Cal.App.2d 58) or Fisherman (237 Cal.App.2d
356) did not lose jurisdiction to impose sentence because of
lapse of time. If probation was timely revoked, judgment
could be imposed at any time thereafter. (See People v. Williams (1944) 24 Cal.2d 848, 853 [151 P.2d 244] ; People v.
Siegel (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 522, 524 [45 Cal.Rptr. 530).)
[2d] We conclude that a prisoner unconstitutionally sentenced under section 1203.2a 8$ it read before the 1963 amendment is in the same position he would have been in had there
been no such statute; that is, unless he competently waives his
rights to be present and represented by counsel at the time of
pronouncement of judgment, he is entitled to be properly
arraigned for jUdgment. The court that originally granted
probation is not deprived of jurisdiction to imp.ose sentence by
the 30-day provision of section 1203.2a. (People v. Fisherman,
supra, 237 Cal.App.2d at pp. 361-362.)
The petitioner is discharged from the custody of the
authorities at San Quentin State Prison and is committed to
the custody of the sheriff of Los Angeles County with directions that petitioner be arraigned for pronouncement of judgment in accordance with this opinion. In all other respects the
petition is denied.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mask, J., and
Burke, J., concurred.
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